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If a person wishes to find anything in the house of another,
he shall enter naked, or wearing only a short tunic and with-
out a girdle, having first taken an oath by the customary
Gods that he expects to find it there; he shall then make his
search, and the other shall throw open his house and allow,
him to search things both sealed and unsealed.
-THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO, Laws Xl!
ILLINOIS SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW-
THE NEW FRONTIER
JAMES R. THOMPSONSNCE PLATO FORMULATED what is probably the first standard for
search without warrant, over 2,000 years ago, the knotty
questions of that area of the law governing searches and seiz-
ures have vexed judges, lawyers and police officers alike. The trouble
lies not with the Constitution-it merely prohibits searches that are
unreasonable.' What has created the difficulty in nearly half our
states since 1914,2 and will in all since June 19, 1961,3 is that reason-
able men simply cannot agree on what is a reasonable search.4 During
1 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. ILL. CoNsT. art. II, § 6 is similar.
2 Beginning with the decision in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), holds that exclusionary rule "is an essential
part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 657.
4 "The course of true law pertaining to searches and seizures, as enunciated here,
has not-to put it mildly-run smooth," Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618
(1961) (concurring opinion); "For some years now, the field (of search and seizure)
has been muddy, but today the Court makes it a quagmire." Chapman v. United States,
supra at 622 (dissenting opinion). "Even as to the substantive rule governing federal
searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment, both the Court and individual Justices
have wavered considerably.... [T]his Court and its members have been ... inconstant
and inconsistent. . . ." Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 134 (1954). No search and
seizure case decided by the United States Supreme Court in the past five years has
been disposed of by unanimous opinion.
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the past two years, however, the Illinois Supreme Court has embarked
on a new course in dealing with cases involving questions of search
and seizure. Mechanical application of old rules has been cast aside;
the restraints of old formulae used for years to classify and restrict
searches without warrant, e.g., search incident to lawful arrest, search
with consent, have been loosened. Attention is now focused on the
critical issue of whether the facts of a particular case, viewed in the
light of a policeman's "responsibility to prevent crime and to catch
criminals,"'5 make a search reasonable or unreasonable.
Nowhere has this new attitude of the Court manifested itself more
clearly than in the much debated, controversial and confusing area
of search incident to lawful arrest and specifically: The right of the
police to search the driver and his automobile following an arrest for
a traffic violation. Two cases, handed down by the Illinois Supreme
Court on the same day, People v. Watkins,6 and People v. Mayo,7
have been praised, defended, analyzed and discussed with much
vigor.' Their net holding, that not all arrests for traffic offenses will
justify a search of the car and driver, however, is really not as star-
tling as has been assumed. These cases have a history.
As an "incident" of a legal arrest, a policeman has the right to
search the person arrested. This is one of the basic rules of search and
seizure law, but it originated long before an exclusionary rule had
ever been formulated to secure the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable search.
The doctrine is generally traced back to an early decision of the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Closson v. Morrison,9 an action
of trover against a sheriff by a person whom he had arrested for
larceny. The court held that the sheriff was entitled to search the
plaintiff because:
A due regard for his own safety on the part of the officer, and also for the
public safety, would justify a sufficient search to ascertain if ... weapons were
carried about the person of the prisoner, or were in his possession .... 10
5 People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 19, 166 N.E.2d 433,437 (1960).
0 19 ll.2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960).
7 19 1ll.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960).
s Comment, 1960 U. ILL. L. F. 440; Bellows, Developments In Criminal Law 1950-
1960, 10 DE PAUL L. REV. 339, 377-80 (1961); Cleary, Developments In Evidence 1950-
1960, 10 DE PAUL L. REV. 422, 424-26 (1961); ILL. S. B. A. SEcTnON ON CRIM. L. NOOSE
LErrEn Vol.8 No. 2 (1960).
9 47 N.H. 482 (1867).
1o ld. at 484.
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And, by the same reasoning, a search to detect money or tools which
might facilitate the escape of the prisoner was also approved.
This rule soon found its way into Illinois law and such a search
was upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court in North v. People." A
dictum by the Appellate Court in Stuart v. Harris12 extended the
rule to include a search for evidence of the crime for which the
person was arrested.
Following the adoption of the exclusionary rule by the Illinois
Supreme Court in 1923," the doctrine of search incident to arrest
was applied to uphold the admission into evidence of robbery pro-
ceeds taken from the defendant at the time of his arrest in People v.
Swift. 14 Swift marked the beginning of a series of cases coming be-
fore the Court in which the facts involved called for an application
of the rule.', Because the circumstances of these cases justified a search
incident to arrest-either for weapons or for evidence of the crime-
the Court did not, in support of its holdings, spell out the specific basis
on which such a search could be made, but merely cited the general
rule that once a lawful arrest was made, a search incident to that
arrest was reasonable and thus outside the constitutional ban.
Then, in People v. Poncher,6 the Supreme Court had occasion to
explain and re-affirm the rule of North:
What the opinion, [North] means to hold, and does hold, is, that if a person
is arrested, he may be searched for weapons and for property in his immediate
personal possession which are involved in the crime charged. In the North
case, as in many others, since decided, it was held that the officer had the
right, upon a lawful arrest, to search the prisoner, as it is incidental to the
right to arrest.17
11139 111.81 (1891).
12 69 111. App. 668 (1897).
13 People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923).
14 319 Ill. 359, 150 N.E. 263 (1925). Swift was the first case to consider the rule in
terms of suppressing evidence illegally seized.
1 5 People v. Hord, 329 Ill. 117, 160 N.E. 135 (1928); People v. Reid, 336 Ill. 421, 168
N.E. 344 (1929); People v. Caruso, 339 Ill. 258, 171 N.E. 128 (1930); People v. Preston,
341 Ill. 407, 173 N.E. 383 (1930); People v. McGum, 341 Ill. 632, 173 N.E. 754 (1930);
People v. DeLuca, 343 I1. 269, 175 N.E. 370 (1931); People v. Kissane, 347 Ill. 385, 179
N.E. 850 (1932); People v. Wetherington, 348 Ill. 310, 180 N.E. 843 (1932); People v.
Roberta, 352 11. 189, 185 N.E. 253 (1933); People v. Macklin, 353 Ill. 64, 186 N.E. 531
(1933); People v. Davies, 354 Ill. 168, 188 N.E. 337 (1933); People v. Brown, 354 Il1. 480,
188 N.E. 529 (1933); People v. Patterson, 354 IMl. 313, 188 N.E. 417 (1933); People v.
Ford, 356 111. 572, 191 N.E. 315 (1934).
16 358 M. 73,192 N.E. 732 (1934).
'7 Id. at 79, 192 N.E. at 734. (Emphasis added.)
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After the Poncher decision, cases involving the rule of search inci-
dent to arrest continued to come before the Court in great numbers.
In most the Court merely cited the general rule;' 8 in a few, the Court
was careful to note that the reasons which justified such a search
were applicable to the particular fact situations presented.' 9
The net effect of all of this was that the specific reasons which lay
back of the doctrine of search incident to arrest were soon buried
under the constant repetition of the general rule. Then came the
automobile cases.
In People v. Barg,2° police officers stopped an automobile being
driven at night without headlights, a violation of the uniform traffic
law, and consequently a misdemeanor. The car was coming from an
area in which a crime had just been committed, and the occupants'
description and conduct gave ample reason for searching the driver
and car for weapons or loot. The Court held that the traffic violation,
plus the attendant suspicious circumstances, justified the search.
In People v. Edge,2' the defendant was arrested for obstructing a
sidewalk with his automobile. A search of his person revealed policy
slips. The evidence on the motion to suppress also showed that the
arresting officer had arrested the defendant for possession of policy
slips just two weeks earlier. The search was upheld as incident to the
arrest.
The first uncritical application of the general rule to a traffic offense
came in People v. Clark.2 There, members of the police gambling
detail came upon Rexford Clark after he had parked his car six inches
farther from the curb than the city ordinance allowed. Seeing a
18 People v. Henneman, 367 111. 151, 10 N.E.2d 649 (1937); People v. Euctice, 371
Ill. 159, 20 N.E.2d 83 (1939); People v. Exum, 382 111. 204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943); People
v. DeMarios, 401 Ill. 146, 81 N.E.2d 464 (1948); People v. DePompeis, 410 Ill. 587, 102
N.E.2d 813 (1952); People v. McGowan, 415 Ill. 375, 114 N.E.2d 407 (1953); People v.
Clark, 7 I1.2d 163, 130 N.E.2d 195 (1955); People v. Kalpak, 10 Ill.2d 411, 140 N.E.2d
726 (1957); People v. Faulkner, 12 Il1.2d 176, 145 N.E.2d 632 (1957); Peope v. Boozer,
12 I1l.2d 184, 145 N.E.2d 619 (1957); People v. Flowers, 14 Ill.2d 406, 152 N.E.2d 838
(1958); People v. LaBostrie, 14 1ll.2d 617, 153 N.E.2d 570 (1958); People v. West, 15
lll.2d 171, 154 N.E.2d 286 (1958); People v. McIntyre, 15 Ill.2d 350, 155 N.E.2d 45 (1959).
19People v. Dubin, 367 Ill. 229, 10 N.E.2d 809 (1937); People v. Lind, 370 111. 131,
18 N.E.2d 189 (1938); People v. Grod, 385 Ill. 584, 53 N.E.2d 591 (1944); People v.
Tillman, I Ill.2d 525, 116 N.E.2d 344 (1953); People v. Heidman, 11 Ill.2d 501, 144
N.E.2d 580 (1957).
20 384 111.172, 51 N.E.2d 168 (1943).
21 406 Ill. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359 (1950).
22 9 Ill.2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820 (1956).
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package bulging from Clark's pocket, the officers, after stopping him,
inquired as to what it contained, and the defendant replied "policy
slips." A search of the car was then made and more policy material
was found. The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the search upon two
grounds. The defendant, the Court said, was in open possession of
policy paraphernalia in the presence of the officers. After arresting
him for this offense, a search of his car was justified as an incident of
the arrest. The Court also ruled, however, that:
If the defendant in fact violated a municipal parking ordinance in the pres-
ence of the officers they had the right to arrest him without a warrant for
that offense .... Where the arrest is justified, for whatever cause, the accom-
panying search is also justified.... So in this case a search incident to an arrest
for a parking violation would be justified.23
This alternative holding of the Clark case marked the first appli-
cation of the doctrine of search incident to arrest to a fact situation
devoid of any reason for search. There was no evidence of the park-
ing violation to be seized; there was no proof to show that the defend-
ant had a criminal record or had been previously arrested by the
officers, or that taking him into custody was contemplated. Conse-
quently, a search for weapons or the means of escape was not justified.
Four years later, the case of People v. Watkins24 reached the Illinois
Supreme Court. Here the defendant, who was known to the police
because they had arrested him on prior occasions, parked his car too
close to a crosswalk. When he saw the officers waiting, he fled into
a building. A search of his person revealed policy slips, and he was
convicted of their possession. By a vote of four justices, the search
was upheld on the sole ground that it was incident to the arrest for
the parking violation. Three justices concurred, on the ground that
the parking violation, plus the attendant suspicious conduct of the
defendant, justified the search, but they disapproved of the single
ground of the majority.25
While a petition for re-hearing was pending in Watkins, the case
of People v. Mayo26 was argued in the Illinois Supreme Court. The
facts in Mayo showed only a parking violation; no concurrent vio-
lation or suspicious conduct on the part of the defendant was in-
23 Id. at 403-04,, 137 N.E.2d at 822. (Emphasis added.) See also, People v. Berry, 17
ll.2d 247, 161 N.E.2d 315 (1959).
24 19 111.2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960).
25 Original Watkins opinion, later withdrawn by the court.
20 19 Ill.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960).
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volved. A search of the automobile glove compartment revealed
policy slips. This was the first case in which the search would have
to be sustained, if at all, solely on the ground that it was an incident
of the traffic violation arrest. Since the reasons for applying the rule
were not present, i.e., no evidence of the parking violation could be
seized, and no search for weapons was necessary, the People conceded
that the search was unconstitutional. After this concession, a modified
opinion in Watkins, and an opinion reversing the conviction in Mayo,
were handed down together at the next term.27
The Mayo-Watkins result, and the concession of the People which
led to that result, have been criticized by prosecutors and police be-
cause they are supposed to have severely cut back the ability of law
enforcement officials to strike at criminal offenses, usually of the
"possession" variety," in accordance with the Clark rationale.29 This
criticism is unjustified on two counts.
First, because the People clearly recognized the unconstitutional
implications of the Clark aberration it was their duty to say so and
to help return the Court to the proper application of the rule of search
incident to arrest.3 0 Second, Mayo-Watkins does not, in fact, limit
the power of the police. Mayo was the first reported case where
suspicious circumstances of one sort or another were not combined
with the traffic violation. Since it is most assuredly not the practice
of the police to search the person and vehicle of all traffic offenders,
it must be that they do so only where, in the words of Justice Schaefer,
"the circumstances [make] it reasonable for the arresting officers to
27 Prior discussions of these two cases have taken the position that the court's hold-
ing in Watkins forced the People's concession in Mayo. "Because of the position which
had been adopted by the court in Watkins, the state conceded that the search was
illegal. . . ." Comment, 1960 U. ILL. L. F. 440, 442-43. "Although the state conceded the
invalidity of the search in the Mayo case the standard announced in the Watkins case
undoubtedly would have been effective without this concession." Bellows, Develop-
ments In Criminal Law 1950-1960, 10 DE PAUL L. REv. 339, 379. This is erroneous. The
original opinion issued by the court in Watkins was not withdrawn until after the
People had filed their brief in People v. Mayo.
28ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 192.28-3 (1959) (narcotics); § 413 (policy slips); S 87
(burglar's tools).
29 This was also the concern of Mr. Justice Daily's special concurrence in Watkins.
See 19 Il1.2d 11, 23-24, 166 N.E.2d 433,439-40 (1960).
30 "The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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assume that they [are] dealing with a situation more serious than a
routine parking violation."'" The problem of the police and prose-
cutors, then, is no more than the task of translating the circumstances
which prompted the officer to make the search into evidence on the
motion to suppress. It was only at this point that Mayo failed, 32 and
where previous prosecutions have encountered no difficulty. 3
Defense lawyers, on the other hand, have hailed Mayo as a bonanza.
Theories have been advanced that no search of the person or vehicle
following an arrest for a traffic violation is valid; that Mayo, in fact,
overruled Watkins. These are clearly erroneous. Mayo stands for no
more than the simple proposition that under the particular facts of
that case the People conceded the invalidity of the search because,
in the words of Watkins, "when no more is sho'wn than that a car
was parked too close to a crosswalk or too far from a curb, the con-
stitution does not permit a policeman to search the driver. 3 4
The rule to be applied when a search following a traffic offense is
made is found only in Watkins, where the search was sustained. As
that case points out, some traffic offenses, in and of themselves, would
justify a search.35 An arrest for drunken driving, or any traffic offense,
in which it is contemplated that the officer will take the offender into
custody will also justify a search for weapons or the means of escape.
While the opinion in Watkins has generally been taken for a new
departure in the area of search incident to a lawful arrest, a study of
the history of the rule in Illinois shows that Watkins merely returned
the Court to the same path that it had been traveling for over seventy
years with only a sporadic departure in People v. Clark. What the
commentators have failed to note, however, is that Mr. Justice
31 People v. Watkins, 19 11.2d 11, 19, 166 N.E.2d 433,437 (1960).
32 "Q. Did you know what you were looking for at the time?
A. Yes, Anything that might have constituted a violation-guns-a knife-policy.
Q. You didn't know what you were looking for, is that correct?
A. As I said before, anything that might constitute a violation.
Q. But, you had nothing specific in mind. Is that correct?
A. Nothing specific, no." Brief for People, pp. 15-16, People v. Mayo, 19 Ill.2d 136,
166 N.E.2d 440 (1960).
33 People v. Barg, 384 111. 172, 51 N.E.2d 168 (1943); People v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490,
94 N.E.2d 359 (1950); People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960).
34 People v./Watkins, supra note 33, at 19, 166 N.E.2d at 437. (Emphasis added.)
35 People v. Berry, 17 Ill.2d 247, 161 N.E.2d 315 (1959); People v. Esposito, 18 ll.2d
104, 163 N.E.2d 487 (1960).
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Schaefer, in writing for the Court in People v. Watkins, set down a
new test for search without warrant which may, in time, rank equally
with the now familiar rule of search incident to arrest:
The constitution prohibits only unreasonable searches; it permits those that
are reasonable. The critical issue in each case must be whether the situation
that confronted the officer justified the search. . . . Police officers often
must act upon a quick appraisal of the data before them, and the reasonable-
ness of their conduct must be judged on the basis of their responsibility to
prevent crime and to catch criminals.3 6
Rules permitting various kinds of search without warrant are fa-
miliar enough-the law of search incident to arrest has already been
discussed. Many jurisdictions recognize another exception to search
without warrant-the right of police officers to stop a moving car
when they have probable cause to believe that it contains contra-
band.37 Or the arrested person may consent to a search.38 The consti-
tution, however, does not set up these exceptions to the search warrant
requirement; they are theories carved out by the courts in compliance
with the constitutional demand that a search be reasonable.
Nothing in the constitution, however, prohibits a search without
warrant based upon probable cause to believe that a crime is being
committed, although that doctrine has not heretofore been recognized
in Illinois. That is the real significance of the Watkins opinion. Not
that it strikes down the doctrine of automatic search following a
traffic violation, but that it recognizes the idea that conditions of law
enforcement may confront the police which justify that a search be
made in light of "their responsibility to prevent crimes and to catch
criminals," even though it cannot be fitted into the familiar classifi-
cations of searches without warrant. The proof of the pudding-
People v. Faginkrantz39
Alfred Faginkrantz parked his car in an alley behind a plumbing
supply firm in the City of Chicago one morning about 4:30 A.M.
He shut the motor and lights off. A police car pulled up, and as
36 19 Ill.2d 11, 18-19, 166 N.E.2d 433, 436-37 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
37 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160 (1949); People v. Gale, 46 Cal.2d 253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956). The Illinois Supreme
Court was presented with the opportunity to adopt this rule in People v. Langford,
No. 35868, Sup. Ct. Ill., 1960, but Langford's death after argument caused the case to
be dismissed as moot.
3SPeople v. Peterson, 17 ll.2d 513, 162 N.E.2d 380 (1959); People v. Fiorito, 19
Ill.2d 246, 166 N.E.2d 606 (1960).
39 21 Ill.2d 75, 171 N.E.2d 5 (1960).
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Faginkrantz stepped from behind the rear of his automobile the offi-
cers stopped to question him because there had been several burglaries
and attempted burglaries in the alley. Faginkrantz produced his iden-
tification which showed that he lived quite distant from the scene.
He also admitted that he had served time in the penitentiary for bur-
glary. Faginkrantz stated that he had stopped in the alley to defecate
following a visit to a tavern in the area, but a search by police officers
could not substantiate this explanation. When the police said they
were taking him to the station for "investigation," Faginkrantz said
that they could search his car. Burglar tools were found in the trunk
of the automobile.
The case was argued in the Supreme Court on the theory that de-
fendant had consented to the search. The Court held, however, that:
It was obviously impractical for the officers to attempt to obtain a search
warrant. The defendant's unlikely explanation of his presence in an alley far
from his home at 4:30 A.M., and his inability to produce any indicia or owner-
ship of the car, coupled with his admitted criminal record and the history of
burglaries in the alley, gave the police reasonable cause to believe that he was
committing a crime. What the constitution prohibits is an unreasonable search
and seizure, and the circumstances of this case do not establish that the search
was unreasonable. The trial court did not err in overruling the motion to sup-
press. People v. Watkins, 19 1I. 2d 11; cf. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S.
307; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98.40
Careful analysis of this holding will show that it is not simply a re-
statement of the law of search incident to a valid arrest.
A peace officer may arrest without warrant in Illinois for "a crimi-
nal offense committed or attempted in his presence, [or] . . . when a
criminal offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
ground for believing that the person to be arrested has committed
it.' 41 The facts confronting the officers in Faginkrantz, before the
finding of the tools, would not justify an arrest under this test. Indeed,
the police told Faginkrantz that they were merely taking him to the
station for "investigation. ' 42 The search cannot be sustained under
the rule that moving vehicles may be searched when there is probable
cause to believe that they contain contraband. And the doctrine of
consent was specifically rejected as a ground of decision. 43
The analogical citations of Draper v. United States,4 and Henry
40 Id. at 78, 171 N.E.2d at 7. (Emphasis added.)
41 ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 38 § 657 (1959).
42 People v. Faginkrantz, 21 Ill.2d 75, 77, 171 N.E.2d 5,7 (1961).
43 Id. at 78, 161 N.E.2d at 7. 44 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
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v. United States45 as support for the Court's holding are puzzling.
Draper, like Henry, deals only with the quantum of evidence neces-
sary to justify arrests without warrant under federal statutes contain-
ing standards less strict than those necessary to sustain arrests with-
out warrant in Illinois.46 A dictum from the dissenting opinion of
Mr. Justice Clark in Henry, however, has a familiar ring when com-
pared with the Watkins rule, as well as the Faginkrantz holding,
quoted above. He said:
When an investigation proceeds to the point where an agent has reasonable
grounds to believe that an offense is being committed in his presence, he is
obligated to proceed to make such searches, seizures, and arrests as the circum-
stances require. It is only by such alertness that crime is discovered, inter-
rupted, prevented, and punished.47
The relative positions, in point of time, of "searches, seizures, and
arrests" in Mr. Justice Clark's view are significant. For from this dic-
tum, together with the dictum of Watkins and the holding of
Faginkrantz, can be drawn a new rule of search and seizure in Illinois:
when a police officer has reasonable grounds, or "probable cause, 48
to believe that a crime is being committed in his presence he may
search the person of the suspect, or that which is immediately under
his control so as to be considered an extension of the person, to obtain
evidence to justify that belief.49 And though a search may be war-
ranted under this constitutional rule where an arrest would not be
under the statute, the Court has never said that the Illinois arrest
statute rests at the outer constitutional boundary. Clearly it does not.
Assuming that a search incident to arrest is proper in a given case,
how far afield may the police go in making the search? Recent de-
cisions of the Illinois Supreme Court indicate that the reasons which
lay back of the rule, e.g., the need to search for weapons to prevent
escape or for evidence of the crime, not only justify the initiation of
the search but may delimit its scope as well.
In approving a search of a defendant's apartment for marked money
45 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
46Compare 26 U.S.C. § 7607 (1954) and 18 U.S.C. S 3052 (1948) with ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, S 657 (1959).
47 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 106 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
48The terms are interchangeable, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 n. 3
(1959).
49 This implication of Watkins was first noted in Comment, 1960 U. ILL. L. F. 440.
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following his arrest for sale of narcotics the Court held, in People v.
Hightower,50 that:
The arrest being lawful, the subsequent search of defendant's premises was
lawful, particularly when it is considered that entry was by defendant's admis-
sion, without force or pretext, and that the money seized was in plain view on
top of a dresser.5'
If there was any doubt that this language indicated a hesitancy on
the part of the Court to approve wide open or prolonged search inci-
dent to arrest it was dispelled by People v. Burnett,52 which followed
a month later. Arresting the defendant in the living room of his home
for keeping a disorderly house, the police took from his pajama
pocket marked money which had earlier been given to two inmates.
The police then went to a bedroom closet in the rear of the apartment
and, in a locked tin box, found obscene photographs. The Court
reversed defendant's conviction for possession of obscene material,
holding that the search which extended to the locked box in a closet
was not one:
[R]easonably necessary to protect the officers or to prevent defendant's
escape. In addition, all the evidence had been gathered which would tend to
prove or to connect defendant and the two women with the offense for which
they had been arrested.53
And despite the general feeling that the Court is more liberal with the
police in sustaining searches and seizures in narcotic cases, 54 the Court
soon decided, in People v. Alexander,55 that a search made by seven
narcotics agents which, ten minutes after the arrest and four feet from
where defendant was arrested, disclosed narcotics, was not reasonably
incident to the arrest of an unarmed woman in her apartment for the
sale of narcotics some two months earlier.
Another area of the law of search without warrant recently re-
visited by the Court involves the doctrine of consent to search. Like
most jurisdictions, Illinois follows the rule that a defendant may con-
sent to the search of his person or home, 6 thus validating what would
50 20 Ill.2d 361, 169 N.E.2d 787 (1960).
51 ld. at 368, 169 N.E.2d at 787. (Emphasis added.)
52 20 Ill.2d 624, 170 N.E.2d 546 (1960). 53 Id. at 626, 170 N.E.2d at 547.
54 Cf. Bellows, Developments In Criminal Law-1950-1960, 10 DE PAUL L. REV. 339,
380 n. 124 (1961).
55 21 Ill.2d 347, 172 N.E.2d 785 (1961).
56 People v. Fiorito, 19 I1l.2d 246, 166 N.E.2d 606 (1960).
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otherwise be an illegal assertion of authority on the part of the police
officers. Quite significantly, however, the burden on the prosecutor
to show that the consent was freely and voluntarily given is consid-
erably less in Illinois than in the federal courts.
In People v. Peterson,57 the defendant testified that, following his
arrest for robbery, the police officer told him they were going to his
house and, when they arrived, the officer took defendant's keys; un-
locked the door to his apartment and searched his closet finding part
of the loot. The officer, on the other hand, said that defendant, pro-
testing his innocence at the time of arrest, said "you can go to my
house and look," and that he admitted him to the apartment volun-
tarily. The Court held:
Whether consent has been given in the particular case is a factual matter to
be determined in the first instance by the trial court, and where the evidence
on the issue is in conflict this court will accept the finding below unless it is
clearly unreasonable.5 8
Contrast this with the decision in Judd v. United States. 9 Judd was
arrested at 11: 00 P.M., and interrogated for several hours in the police
station. The police testified that Judd, in answer to police inquiries,
denied having any burglar tools or a certain pair of shoes in his home
and that as he had nothing to hide, the police could go out to his home.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held, under these circumstances, that there had "not been a sufficient
showing of true consent, free of duress and coercion, ' 60 noting that
the "burden on the Government is particularly heavy in cases where
the individual is under arrest. Non-resistance to the orders or sugges-
tions of the police is not infrequent in such a situation; true consent,
free of fear or pressure, is not so readily to be found."'61
Some months following the decision in Peterson, the Illinois Su-
preme Court was again faced with a consent case in which the ra-
tionale of Judd, and like federal cases, was urged upon the Court. The
Court rejected the plea and upheld the consent as freely given al-
though the defendant was, at the time, sitting in the car of Federal
57 17 ll.2d 513, 162 N.E.2d 380 (1959).
58 Id. at 514-15, 162 N.E.2d at 381.
59 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
6o Id. at 652. 6 1 Id. at 651.
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Bureau of Investigation agents who were questioning him about a re-
cent jewel robbery.6 2
A corollary to the rule that one may consent to an otherwise un-
lawful search is the doctrine that a wife, with the right of joint occu-
pation or ownership in the premises involved, may consent to a search,
and evidence found will be admissible against the husband.6 3 An early
case, People v. Lind,64 had held, however, that where the wife, at the
hearing on the motion to suppress, denies the testimony of the police
that she consented to the search, such a denial was a significant factor
to be considered in determining whether the consent was voluntary.
Faced wtih this holding, and with recent criticism of the Peterson
doctrine,65 the Illinois Supreme Court heard the case of People v.
Speice.66
In Speice, the officers testified that Mrs. Speice invited them into
the apartment and led them to the bedroom where her husband had
earlier brought in stolen goods. Mrs. Speice testified, however, that
the police brought her husband to the apartment in handcuffs and
searched the apartment without a warrant. Defendant's testimony was
to the same effect. In holding the search valid, the Court rejected the
rule of Lind-that a conflict of testimony as to consent was a factor in
determining whether the consent was freely given-and brought the
husband-wife waiver doctrine squarely into line with the Peterson
rule which vests almost complete discretion in the trial court to deter-
mine the issue of voluntariness. 67
Still another fundamental problem just resolved by the Court con-
cerns the standing of a defendant to raise the question of illegal search
62 People v. Fiorito, 19 1l1.2d 246, 166 N.E.2d 606 (1960). The defendant urged the
court to abandon Peterson and follow such decisions as Judd v. United States; United
States v. Arrington, 215 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1954); Catalanotte v. United States, 208
F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1953). Brief for Defendant, pp. 33-39.
63 People v. Shambley, 4 11l.2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954); People v. Perroni, 14
1ll.2d 581, 153 N.E.2d 578 (1958).
64 370 111. 131, 18 N.E.2d 189 (1938).
65 Bellows, Developments In Criminal Law 1950-1960, 10 DE PAUL L. REv. 339 (1961).
66 23 l1.2d 40, 177 N.E.2d 233 (1961).
67 "This [defendant's] argument would have the effect of taking from the trial
judge the right to pass upon the credibility of the testimony and would require us
to hold that in the event of a conflict in the testimony as to whether consent was
given we must decide that the consent was not freely given." People v. Speice, supra
note 65, at 44; 177 N.E.2d at 235.
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and seizure. The rule is that a motion to suppress will not lie where the
defendant does not claim ownership or demand the return of the
property seized. 68 As the federal courts have recognized, however,
a defendant charged with the possession of contraband faces a di-
lemma. If he admits the possession of narcotics, for example, in a
sworn motion to suppress, he admits the offense. If he fails to admit
possession, his motion to suppress will not lie. 69 The Supreme
Court resolved the dilemma in Jones v. United States70 by holding
that "[i]n cases where the indictment itself charges possession, the de-
fendant ... is revealed as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure' upon a motion to suppress evidence prior to trial."7' 1 The
Illinois Supreme Court soon indicated, in Mayo, that it would follow
this holding.72 Professor Edward Cleary, in commenting upon these
cases, thought that the Illinois Court there "gave a clear indication of
its willingness to re-examine the entire matter of standing.' 73 This esti-
mation has proved to be accurate.
In People v. Kelley,'7 the Court was confronted with a standing
problem falling between the old rule which generally requires an
allegation of ownership and the Jones-Mayo rule which obviates the
need for an allegation of possession or ownership in a motion to sup-
press when the charge is possession of contraband. William Kelley
and a co-defendant were indicted for armed robbery. The complain-
ing witness could not identify his assailants and the proof against the
defendants rested solely upon their recent, exclusive and unexplained
possession of the victim's watch and wallet. Kelley's motion to sup-
press explicitly denied ownership or possession of the articles and did
not demand their return.
The Court held that the dilemma present in Jones did not confront
Kelley inasmuch as he was not charged with the possession of the
watch and wallet-"The charge in the indictment is armed robbery
and the articles allegedly taken in the search are only evidence of the
defendant's guilt of that crime."75 The door, opened a crack to de-
68 People v. Perroni, 14 Ill.2d 581, 153 N.E.2d 578 (1958).
609 Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1932).
70 362 U.S. 257 (1960). 71 Id. at 264-65.
72 19 Ill.2d 136, 166 NZE.2d 440 (1960).
73 Cleary, Developments In Evidence 1950-1960, 10 DE PAUL L. REV. 422, 426 (1961).
74 - 1ll.2d -, - N.E.2d - (1961).
75 People v. Kelley, supra note 72 at -, - N.E.2d at -. (Emphasis added.)
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fendants in Mayo, therefore, has been slammed shut by the Court in
Kelley.
On balance, it is fair to say that the search and seizure rulings
handed down by the Illinois Supreme Court in the past two years have
contributed to the advancement of effective law enforcement,76 and
at the same time have reflected the Court's continuing vigilance to see
that the citizen's liberty is not unlawfully abridged even where the
charge is a repugnant one. 77 One question remains however. What will
be the effect of Mapp v. Ohio78 on the Illinois Court's rulings which,
at first blush, may not square with prior federal decisions in the same
area? Now that Mapp holds that the exclusionary rule is an integral
part of the fourteenth amendment, will the Illinois Supreme Court
have to conform its recent decisions on standing, consent, and search
without warrant to the more conservative federal law? One com-
mentator has indicated a belief that as to the rule governing standing
to supress evidence, future questions "will in the main be resolved by
federal law."'79 Though the United States Supreme Court was careful
to say in Mapp that a state's procedural rules governing the issue of
unlawful search and seizures will be respected, 0 it is almost certain
that the new rule of search without warrant formulated by the Wat-
kins-Faginkrantz line of cases, and the more liberal rule of search
with consent now employed in Illinois, will be subjected to careful
scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court in future cases as sub-
stantive constitutional doctrines. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court,
having in sight the new frontier, may now find the United States
Supreme Court waiting at the pass.
76 People v. Faginkrantz, 21 Ill.2d 75, 171 N.E.2d 5 (1960).
77 People v. Alexander, 21 Ill.2d 347, 172 N.E.2d 785 (1961).
78 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
79 Allen, The Exclusionary Rule In The American Law of Search and Seizure, 52
J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 246, 254 (1961).
80 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,659 (1961).
